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Robert Rosen's (M,R) system is an abstract biological network architecture that is 16 
allegedly both irreducible to sub-models of its component states and non-17 
computable on a Turing machine.  (M,R) stands as an obstacle to both reductionist 18 
and mechanistic presentations of systems biology, principally due to its self-19 
referential structure.  If (M,R) has the properties claimed for it, computational 20 
systems biology will not be possible, or at best will be a science of approximate 21 
simulations rather than accurate models.  Several attempts have been made, at both 22 
empirical and theoretical levels, to disprove this assertion by instantiating (M,R) in 23 
software architectures.  So far, these efforts have been inconclusive.  In this paper, 24 
we attempt to demonstrate why - by showing how both finite state machine and 25 
stream X-machine formal architectures fail to capture the self-referential 26 
requirements of (M,R).  We then show that a solution may be found in 27 
communicating X-machines, which remove self-reference using parallel 28 
computation, and then synthesize such machine architectures with object-29 
orientation to create a formal basis for future software instantiations of (M,R) 30 
systems. 31 
 32 
1. Introduction 33 
The quest for mechanistic explanation in biology reflects a long-standing 34 
commitment to avoid the error of Molière’s physician, who explained opium’s sleep-35 




inducing properties as being caused by its virtus dormitiva (Molière, 1673).   36 
Mechanism asks the question: “how does it work?” and expects a non-tautologous 37 
answer couched in some kind of machine-like analogy.  If the mechanistic 38 
explanation is also a reductionist one, it will situate that machine-like analogy at a 39 
lower level of biological organization.  “How does an organism work?” might be 40 
explained in terms of the mechanism of organs; “how does an organ work?” in terms 41 
of the mechanism of cells; and “how do cells work?” in terms of molecular 42 
mechanisms.  Intermediate levels are easy to insert – gene or metabolic regulatory 43 
networks might be placed between molecules and cells, or organelles between cells 44 
and molecules.  The layered hierarchy of explanations is mirrored by a corresponding 45 
hierarchy of research disciplines, from population biologists at the top, through 46 
organismal zoologists and botanists to physiologists, then cell biologists, systems 47 
biologists and biochemists, with molecular biophysicists occupying the layer where 48 
biology shades imperceptibly into quantum organic chemistry. 49 
 50 
The concept of levels of understanding of the natural world and their corresponding 51 
inter-dependent allocation of scientific labour goes as far back as Auguste Comte in 52 
the early 19th century (Comte, 1830; Lenzer, 1998), and a recognisably modern 53 
formulation emerged from the interwar Vienna Circle group of philosophers (Carnap, 54 
1934), but its central place in the minds of modern biologists was finally cemented 55 
by Francis Crick (1966; 1981) and Jacques Monod (1971).  Such reductionism has 56 
always had its critics (Elsasser, 1998; Polanyi, 1968; Rosen, 1991; Waddington, 1968), 57 
and their successors have grown bolder since the advent of an explicitly anti-58 
reductionist strand in systems biology (reviews by Gatherer, 2010; Mazzocchi, 2012).  59 





Even if current “how does it work?” questions in systems biology can no longer rely 61 
so heavily on reductionist answers, it is harder to dispense with mechanistic ones.  62 
Even if a modern systems biologist does not believe that the function of a particular 63 
regulatory network can be understood in terms of a composite understanding of its 64 
parts, nevertheless a non-reductive explanation will still be likely to contain 65 
machine-like analogies of some kind.  The roots of mechanistic explanation in biology 66 
are even deeper than those of reductionism, perhaps as far back as the 17th century 67 
(reviewed by Letelier et al., 2011) – otherwise the audiences of 1673 could scarcely 68 
have appreciated Molière’s joke concerning virtus dormitiva - and were completely 69 
in the ascendency by the early 20th century (Loeb, 1912).  In the era of molecular 70 
biology, opposition to mechanism has been sporadic and muted. 71 
 72 
Robert Rosen made it his life’s work to question both reductionist and mechanist 73 
strategies in biology.  Developing the mathematical techniques of relational biology 74 
originated by Rashevsky (1973), Rosen conceived an abstract model, (M,R), always 75 
written with brackets and usually in italics (Figure 1), which he claimed encapsulated 76 
the properties of a living system but was irreducible to its component parts (Rosen, 77 
1964a; 1964b; 1966; 1991; 2000).  Goudsmit (2007) redrew the (M,R) diagram in a 78 
way that is more comprehensible to biochemists, implicitly recasting (M,R) as a 79 
representation of a biochemical network consisting of three reactions, each of which 80 
produces a catalyst for one of the other reactions.  Rosen’s intentions were more 81 
general, presenting (M,R) as consisting of three broad processes found in all living 82 
systems: metabolism, repair and replication.  Metabolism is represented by the A→B 83 




process, repair by B→f and replication by f→ϕ, generating respectively the catalysts 84 
necessary for metabolism, and in turn the catalysts for synthesis of those catalysts. 85 
 86 
Figure 1 a: The Goudsmit representation of the (M,R) system.  b: (M,R) diagram of 87 
Rosen. In the Goudsmit representation, productive reactions are shown using the 88 
black arrows and catalytic requirements using the red dotted arrows.  In the (M,R) 89 
diagram of Rosen, the productive reactions are presented as open-headed arrows 90 
and the catalytic reactions as fill-headed arrows.  The placement of the catalytic 91 
arrowheads is also on the substrate of the productive reaction. 92 
 93 
The essence of Rosen’s argument (Rosen, 1991) is that although each of the 94 
components of (M,R) can be understood as a machine, and therefore may be 95 
susceptible to mechanistic explanation, the whole cannot and may not.  96 
Furthermore, a model of the whole cannot be built additively from models of the 97 




components.  (M,R) is thus not only non-mechanistic but also irreducible, and insofar 98 
as (M,R) is an accurate general model of a living system, much of modern biology 99 
therefore relies on an explanatory framework that is deemed unfit for purpose. 100 
 101 
An attempt to prove Rosen’s argument has been advanced by Louie (2005; 2007b; 102 
2009), who has used category theory to express (M,R) in terms of sets of mappings, 103 
and to demonstrate that (M,R) contains an impredicative set, rendering it non-104 
computable in finite time on a Turing machine (Radó, 1962; Turing, 1936; Whitehead 105 
and Russell, 1927).  There is no space here to reproduce Louie’s proof but, in 106 
summary, impredicativity is the condition arising when a set is a member of itself, 107 
and impredicativity may emerge in any mathematical analysis of a system that is self-108 
referential.  The individual processes within (M,R) are computable in finite time but, 109 
when assembled, self-reference is unavoidable and the whole (M,R) ceases to be 110 
computable.  (M,R)’s irreducibility to computable software components mirrors life’s 111 
irreducibility to mechanistic sub-processes. 112 
 113 
Relational biology, in the form conceived by Rosen and Louie, has been vigorously 114 
debated (Chu and Ho, 2006; 2007a; 2007b; Goertzel, 2002; Gutierrez et al., 2011; 115 
Landauer and Bellman, 2002; Louie, 2004; 2007a; 2011; Wells, 2006), and the alleged 116 
non-computability of (M,R) has also inspired various attempts to instantiate it in 117 
software systems (reviewed in Zhang et al., 2016).  Relational biologists do not deny 118 
that an approximation to (M,R), capable of running on a Turing computer, could be 119 
created.  Crucially, however, such an approximation would not capture all the 120 
properties of the (M,R) system.  It would be merely a simulation, rather than a true 121 




model.   The distinction between simulation and model is central to relational 122 
biology’s critique of computational systems biology.  Simulations may accurately 123 
mirror the inputs and outputs of a system, and indeed would need to do so to be 124 
judged as good simulations, but their internal causal factors – their entailment 125 
structures, in Rosen’s terminology – could merely be arbitrary approximations, 126 
“black boxes” which may be pragmatically useful but essentially are the creation of 127 
the programmer.  A true model, by contrast has entailment structures which logically 128 
mirror those of the real world, and correctly formed models are necessary for a 129 
genuine understanding of the system being modelled (Louie, 2009; Rosen, 1991; 130 
2000).  Weather forecasting, for instance, is largely conducted by simulation, with 131 
computers processing current weather data in the light of previous records and 132 
making a prediction for the future.  Rocketry, by contrast, calculates the future 133 
position of a space satellite on the basis of data on its current physical situation and 134 
precise models derived from the laws of physics.  Both may require complex 135 
calculations, but the weather forecaster does not pretend to understand, or 136 
calculate, every influence on the weather.  Rocketry, by contrast, does claim a true 137 
understanding of all factors influencing the rocket’s trajectory in space.  Rocket 138 
science uses a model, weather forecasting uses a simulation.  Relational biologists 139 
would claim that our current approach to the analysis of complex biological systems 140 
has much more in common with weather forecasting than rocket science. 141 
 142 
In keeping with this, Louie (2011, section 2) has judged some of the software 143 
instantiations of (M,R) produced so far to be simulations rather than models, and 144 
this has been acknowledged by some of the authors concerned (Gatherer and 145 




Galpin, 2013; Prideaux, 2011).  Similarly, other mathematical re-workings of (M,R) 146 
which provide theoretical bases for computability, if not actual software 147 
instantiations (Landauer and Bellman, 2002; Mossio et al., 2009), have been likewise 148 
found lacking in various necessary aspects (Cardenas et al., 2010; Letelier et al., 149 
2006). 150 
 151 
Much of the controversy is dependent on Rosen’s original definition of machine and 152 
mechanism (Rosen, 1964a; 1964b; 1966; 1991) which essentially stems from that of 153 
Turing (1936).  However, since then, an expanded conception of the nature of 154 
machines has begun to develop, in particular the notion of X-machines (Coakley et 155 
al., 2006; Holcombe, 1988; Kefalas et al., 2003a; 2003b; Stamatopoulou et al., 2007).  156 
We believe that the current impasse over the irreducibility of (M,R) may be resolved 157 
by reconsidering (M,R) in terms of a communicating X-machine, and that is the 158 
subject of this paper. 159 
 160 
In the Methods section we show how various formal machine architectures – namely 161 
finite state machine, stream X-machine and communicating X-machine - are 162 
conceived in abstract terms.  We show how these formal architectures exist in a 163 
series – stream X-machines expanding on finite state machines, and communicating 164 
X-machines representing a further widening in scope and properties.  We then 165 
repeat this process, casting (M,R) in terms of each formal machine architecture, 166 
pointing out the difficulties where appropriate.  The stream X-machine is shown to 167 
add flexibility to the finite state machine, but nevertheless still fails to express all the 168 
properties of (M,R).  Then, the communicating X-machine composed of stream X-169 




machine components is shown to be the best fit, dispensing in particular with the 170 
self-reference that is the central obstacle to computability.  Finally, we discuss the 171 
kind of computer architecture necessary to implement such a formal machine 172 
architecture.  173 
 174 
2. Methods 175 
 176 
We follow Coakley et al. (2006) in building our communicating X-machine model 177 
through an iterative process of adding increasing levels of granularity regarding the 178 
underlying mechanistic behaviours of the system.  We attempt as far as possible to 179 
reproduce the notation used in that paper, but make some small changes for two 180 
reasons: a) some of the symbols of Coakley et al. (2006) duplicate those used in 181 
(M,R), in which case alternatives are introduced, b) we alter some symbols to 182 
emphasise points of similarity and difference between finite state machines and X-183 
machines.  The first step is to define the (M,R) system as a finite state machine (see 184 
section 2.1), before adding the concept of memory (stream X-machine; see section 185 
2.2); and ultimately the individual instantiation, as stream X-machines in their own 186 
right, of the different system components, along with the resulting communications 187 
between them (communicating X-machines; see section 2.3) . 188 
 189 
2.1 Finite State Machine 190 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (Σ,𝑄𝑄, 𝑞𝑞0,𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇) 
A 5-tuple where: 191 
• Σ is a finite alphabet of input symbols 192 




• Q is the finite set of system states 193 
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial system state 194 
• F ⊂ Q is a set of final (or accepting states) 195 
• T is the transition function (T: Q x Σ → Q) 196 
The transition function governs the change from one system state, qx ∈ Q, to the 197 
next, qx+1 ∈ Q, according to the input received, σx ∈ Σ.  We expand the transition 198 
function, adapting Keller (2001): 199 
• T = {(Ti)i=1…..H,Q,Σ} 200 
• q ⊂ Q 201 
• σ ⊂ Σ 202 
TH(qH-1, σ) is thus the final transition function in a series of H state transitions, after 203 
which the system enters state F, equivalent to qH. 204 
 205 
Figure 2 illustrates in graphical form the principles of the finite state machine, 206 
illustrating the interaction of current state and input within one or more functions to 207 
produce the next state in the series. 208 
 209 





Figure 2: Finite state machine in graphical representation.  Here only a single state 211 
transition is represented for clarity, but if the final state is recycled to the initial 212 
state, the process can iterate until an accepting state is reached.  213 
2.2 Stream X-Machine 214 
𝑋𝑋 = (Σ,Γ,𝑄𝑄,𝐹𝐹, 𝑞𝑞0,𝑚𝑚0,𝑇𝑇,𝑃𝑃) 
An 8-tuple, where: 215 
• Σ is a finite alphabet of input symbols (as for the finite state machine) 216 
• Γ is a finite alphabet of output symbols  217 
• Q is the finite set of system states (as for the finite state machine) 218 
• M is an infinite set of memory states 219 
• q0 ∈ Q and m0 ∈ M are the initial system state and initial memory state, 220 
respectively 221 




• T is the type of the machine X, defined as a set of partial functions (T: M x Σ 222 
→ M x Γ) 223 
• P is the transition partial function (P: Q x T → Q) 224 
The X-machine expands the finite state machine by virtue of the presence of stored 225 
memory states, M and output alphabet Γ.  The output alphabet can be thought of as 226 
a set of signals circulating within the system or transmitted beyond the system 227 
(Stamatopoulou et al., 2007). The transition partial function of the X-machine, P, 228 
thus depends on current system state, qx, and another partial function, T, dependent 229 
on current memory and input and which produces modified memory and output.  P 230 
is therefore expressible as a 2-dimensional state transition diagram.  By contrast the 231 
transition function of the finite state machine depends only on current system state 232 
and input. 233 
 234 
Figure 3 illustrates in graphical form the principles of the stream X-machine.  The 235 
“state” component is equivalent to the finite state machine (Figure 2), with the 236 
stream X-machine having an added “memory” component.  237 
 238 




Figure 3: Stream X-machine in graphical representation.  As in Figure 2, only a single 239 
state transition is represented for clarity.  If the new state becomes the current 240 
state, and the new memory the current memory, the machine will iterate until an 241 
accepting state is achieved.  At each iteration a new output signal is also generated. 242 
 243 
 244 
2.3 Communicating X-Machine 245 
Stream X-machines as defined above have no capacity to communicate with each 246 
other.  Unlike finite state machines, they store memory and signal to the outside 247 
world, but have no capacity to identify and interact with other similar stream X-248 
machines in that exterior environment.  The functionality to allow communication 249 
between individual X-machines is added via a communication relation, R, as follows:  250 ((𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥)𝑖𝑖=1..𝑛𝑛,𝑅𝑅) 
Where: 251 
• 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥  is the i-th X-machine 252 
• R is a communication relation between n X-machines 253 
R is expressible as a matrix of cells(i,j) each defining specific communication rules 254 
between the i-th and j-th X-machine or, less prescriptively, as a list of generic 255 
communication rules that govern interaction of any X-machine with any other 256 
(Coakley et al., 2006). 257 
 258 
Figure 4 illustrates in graphical form the principles of the communicating X-machine.  259 
The “state” and “memory” components together are equivalent to the stream X-260 




machine (Figure 3), with the communicating X-machine having an added 261 
“communication” component consisting of a list of rules governing how the X-262 
machines interact.  263 
 264 
Figure 4: Communicating X-machine in graphical representation.  As in Figure 3, 265 
iteration of the system via conversion of the new state to the current state, is 266 
omitted for clarity.  The input-output stream of the stream X-machine is replaced by 267 
a set of communications. 268 
 269 
3. Results 270 
 271 
3.1 Finite State Machine 272 
Figure 1 shows how (M,R) consists of three components involved in productive 273 
reactions: A, B and f.  A is converted to B, B converted to f and f converted to ϕ.  274 
However, these reactions must be catalysed.  In one reaction this is relatively 275 




straightforward: B→f requires ϕ.  However, the other two catalysts are more 276 
complicated.  B can be seen as dual-function, being the substrate for the B→f 277 
reaction and also the catalyst for the f→ϕ reaction.  Likewise, f is both the substrate 278 
for the f→ϕ reaction and the catalyst for the A→B reaction.  This issue has been 279 
discussed in some detail in the (M,R) literature (Cardenas et al., 2010; Letelier et al., 280 
2006; Louie, 2011; Mossio et al., 2009).  We therefore define b as the catalytic 281 
component of B, and f’ as the catalytic component of f. 282 
 283 
Mass flows within the (M,R) system from A to B/b, from B to f/f’ and from f to ϕ.  284 
Our first step is therefore to attempt to express this mass flow as a finite state 285 
machine using the generic definition (Coakley et al., 2006) given in section 2.1, as 286 
follows. 287 
 288 
Input: Σ = {b, f’, ϕ} 289 
System states: Q = {A, B, b, f, f’, ϕ} 290 
Initial system state: q0 = {A} 291 
Accepting states: F = {b, f’, ϕ} 292 
Transition functions: T, of variants x ∈ {B, b, f, f’, ϕ} such that: 293 
• T = {(Tix)i=1…..H,Q,Σ}, specifically 294 
• T1B = {T: A x f’ → B} 295 
• T1b = {T: A x f’ → b} 296 
• T2f  = {T: B x ϕ →  f} 297 




• T2f' = {T: B x ϕ →  f’} 298 
• T3
ϕ = {T: f x b → ϕ} 299 
 300 
The input set, Σ, to the finite state machine are the catalysts, which trigger the state 301 
transition functions T, but are not transformed by them.  The catalysts b and f’, if 302 
defined in this way, are themselves also products of the metabolic reactions, but 303 
never substrates, hence their appearance as accepting states, F.  The choice of 304 
function TxB over Txb, or Txf  over Txf', must be regarded as a stochastic choice.   305 
 306 
The difficulties posed for finite state machines by (M,R) relate firstly to this necessity 307 
to enter a stochastic element into the transition process, and also to the role of 308 
catalysts in the generic state transition function T: Q x Σ → Q.  T implies a separation 309 
between system state and signal, between system and environment, but catalysts 310 
are required here to be both entailments in processes, i.e. input, and also the results 311 
of those processes, i.e. system states.  In Rosen’s definition of a finite state machine, 312 
the entailments are all external, whereas in attempting to express (M,R) as a finite 313 
state machine, we require the entailments – the input signals Σ - to be states of the 314 
system itself, and for the system thereby to be self-referential.  Since finite state 315 
machines cannot have this property, we therefore produce an entity which cannot 316 
be a finite state machine if it is to instantiate (M,R) and cannot be (M,R) if it is a 317 
satisfactory finite state machine.   318 
 319 




More generally, it can also be seen that mass flow trajectories through the finite 320 
state machine as defined here will only encompass a subset of system states before 321 
reaching their accepting states.  For instance, A → B → f→ ϕ does not include f’ or b 322 
among the states through which it transits.  Likewise, A → B → f’ does not include b 323 
or ϕ, and A → b  reaches an accepting state after a single state transition, and so on.  324 
Finite state machines can at best only describe sub-systems within (M,R), and cannot 325 
furnish a complete description of its entirety. 326 
 327 
3.2 Stream X- Machine 328 
Repetition of the above exercise, expanding the finite state machine representation 329 
of (M,R) into a stream X-machine using the generic definition (Coakley et al., 2006) 330 
given in section 2.2, does not appreciably improve the situation.  Although the 331 
stream X-machine benefits from the potential to possess memory states and 332 
generate an output alphabet, it is not clear what these properties represent in the 333 
context of (M,R).  For instance, memory may be used in order to allow each of the 334 
catalytic elements in the system, b, f’, ϕ, to be re-used, by storing a value 335 
corresponding to the number of times that catalyst operated on a substrate.  If H re-336 
uses of each catalyst were allowed, this would effectively expand the system state 337 
list to: 338 
• Q = {A, B, b0...bH-1, f, f’0...f’H-1, ϕ0...ϕH-1, Ω} 339 
Ω is added to signify the state after the H iterations have finished.  The input 340 
alphabet expands correspondingly: 341 
• Σ = {b0...bH-1, f’0...f’H-1, ϕ0...ϕH-1} 342 




And the output alphabet is: 343 
• Γ = {b1...bH-1, f’1...f’H-1, ϕ1...ϕH-1, Ω} 344 
The number of accepting states reduces to: 345 
• F = {Ω} 346 
 347 
We can then proceed to define the stream X-machine type, T: M x Σ → M x Γ, and 348 
the partial transition functions dependent on that type, P: Q x T → Q.  The mappings 349 
from memory and input to memory and output constituting the type, T, are best 350 
visualised in tabular form (Table 1).  Memory, M, is defined as a variable that allows 351 
for H re-uses of each catalyst prior to the accepting state Ω. 352 
 353 
  
  Σ   
bn f'n ϕn 
  0 b1+M1 f'1+M1 ϕ1+M1 
M n bn+1+Mn+1 f'n+1+Mn+1 ϕn+1+Mn+1 
  H Ω+M0 Ω+M0 Ω+M0 
 354 
Table 1: T-functions for the stream X-machine realization of (M,R).  Rows M define 355 
memory states over n = zero to H.  Columns Σ define the inputs also over n = zero to 356 
H-1.  Table values define the output and next memory state. 357 
 358 
Table 1 illustrates the re-use of catalytic elements for H occasions.  Each time a 359 
catalyst is used, the memory state of the system is ratcheted up by one, and the 360 
catalyst re-emerges as output.  On the Hth occasion the system dies, Ω is returned 361 




and memory is reset to zero.  Table 1, representing T: M x Σ → M x Γ, can then be 362 
combined with system states in the state transition diagram, P: Q X T → Q (Table 2) 363 
 364 
  
        Q   
A B b0...bH-1 f f'0...f'H-1 ϕ0...ϕH-1 
  bxMx       ϕ     
T f'xMx B/b           
  ϕxMx   f/f'         
 365 
Table 2: P-functions for the stream X-machine realization of (M,R).  Columns Q 366 
define system states.  Rows T define the T-functions (Table 1), over x=1 to x=H-1.  367 
Table values define the next system state.  Empty cells indicate invalid Q/T 368 
combinations, thus generating null returns on system state. 369 
 370 
The rows of Table 2, T, are a compaction of Table 1, representing each combination 371 
of input Σ and memory M at time x and how it interacts with the set of system 372 
states, Q, to produce a new system state.  Table 2 is a sparse state transition diagram 373 
as {b0...bH-1, f’0...f’H-1, ϕ0...ϕH-1} ⊂ Q do not generate state transitions.  As with the 374 
transition functions of the finite state machine (Section 3.1), the partial functions 375 
acting on A and B will produce either B or b, or f or f’, respectively with stochastic 376 
distribution of probabilities.  Expansion of the finite state machine to a stream X-377 
machine therefore does not immediately suggest a solution to the problems of 378 
defining entailment and state, or of self-reference, and therefore again falls short of 379 
a mechanistic realization of (M,R).  380 
 381 




3.3 Communicating X-Machine 382 
Communicating X-machines (section 2.3) build upon the concept of stream X-383 
machines so that they may be used to model at the component or sub-system level, 384 
and allow communication between these individual components/sub-systems to 385 
facilitate emergent behaviour at the level of the entire system. As such, 386 
communicating X-machine systems are comprised of multiple instantiations of the 387 
different types of stream X-machine components.  For (M,R), their interactions may 388 
be abstractly represented in matrix form (Table 3): 389 
 390 
        i       
  
A B bx f f'x ϕx 
  A 
    
B/b+ f'x+1 
   B 
     
f/f'+ϕx-1 
  bx 
   
ϕ+ bx+1 
  j f 
  
ϕ+ bx+1 
     f'x B/b+ f'x+1 
       ϕx 
 
f/f'+ϕx+1 
     391 
Table 3: Communication relations, R, between the ith and jth stream X-machines in 392 
a communicating X-machine.  Entries describe the system states of the ith and jth 393 
stream X-machines after each interaction.  Empty cells indicate non-interacting 394 
combinations, thus generating null returns on system states. 395 
 396 
Unlike Table 2, which shows state/memory transitions within a single stream X-397 
machine, Table 3 shows the rules governing the interaction of two stream X-398 
machines.  The entailments are thus external to each stream X-machine but internal 399 




to the communicating X-machine of the entire system.  Table 3 only presents the 400 
consequences of communication between two stream X-machines in terms of their 401 
system states.  Their memory states and other internal properties will alter as 402 
described in section 3:2.  Table 3 assumes that the memory value, x, can increase 403 
indefinitely, but where x = H, states f'x+1 , bx+1 and ϕx+1 will be Ω. 404 
 405 
Crucially, there is no self-reference represented within Table 3.  The entailments 406 
operating on each individual stream X-machine are external, i.e. emanate from other 407 
stream X-machines.  An individual stream X-machine will not undergo a state 408 
transition unless it encounters another stream X-machine that can deliver the 409 
appropriate signal. 410 
 411 
3.4 Object-Oriented Communicating X-Machine 412 
We previously attempted (Zhang et al., 2016) to represent (M,R) using Unified 413 
Modelling Language (UML) which provides various tools for object-oriented systems 414 
analysis.  Correctly formed UML constitutes a basis for representation of the 415 
modelled system in any object-oriented programming language.  Using UML, we 416 
were able to construct UML state machine diagrams for individual classes in (M,R), 417 
where A, B, b, f, f’ and ϕ are classes composed of objects of that type (Figure 6 of 418 
Zhang et al. (2016)).  We also constructed a UML communication diagram (Figures 4 419 
and 5 of Zhang et al. (2016)) which we noted bore a strong resemblance to Rosen’s 420 
original (M,R) diagram.  The UML communication diagram is conceptually equivalent 421 
to the communication relations matrix, R, presented here in Table 3.  To attempt to 422 




synthesise the communicating X-machine and object-oriented approaches to (M,R), 423 
we begin with the cartoon diagram of Figure 5, which illustrates an (M,R) system, 424 
arbitrarily bounded for clarity, populated by a selection of the relevant objects using 425 
a simplified UML class notation.  426 
 427 
Figure 5: Object-oriented (M,R) instantiation. Objects of the six classes A, B, b, f, f’ 428 
and ϕ as defined by Zhang et al. (2016) contained within an arbitrary system 429 
boundary. 430 
 431 
Each of the objects within Figure 5 is represented in the simplified UML class 432 
notation with its functions below the horizontal line.  For instance, an object of class 433 
f has a function +produceϕ(), indicating that this object can be transformed into an 434 
object of class ϕ, which will then possess the function +catalyseRepair(B): f/f’, 435 




indicating that it will catalyse the production of f or f’, by stochastic choice previously 436 
discussed, from B. Representing the objects as individual communicating X-437 
machines, with all of the associated syntax for inputs, memory, states, functions and 438 
outputs (not shown), resulted in an overwhelmingly complicated diagrammatic 439 
model.  As such, we have developed the cartoon diagram in Figure 6, which  440 
integrates  the object-oriented (M,R) diagram in Figure 5 with the communication 441 
relations matrix in Table 3, and also adds a memory component (as in Figure 4) to 442 
those objects that require it. 443 
 444 
445 
Figure 6:  Object-oriented (M,R) instantiation as communicating X-machine. Detail 446 
of Figure 5, with the addition of the communication relations matrix, R, (Table 3) as 447 
inset.  Arrows indicate interactions as specified by R. 448 





In Figure 6, each object is connected by a double-headed arrow to each other object 450 
with which it is capable of communication, as specified by the communications 451 
relations matrix, R.  Notice that the object of class b does not have any 452 
communication relation within this frame, since it can only interact with objects of 453 
class f - not shown in Figure 6 simply for reasons of space.  Figure 6 differs from 454 
Figure 5 in that each object has its memory state added in the form Mx, following 455 
Table 1.  This extends the original class diagrams given in Figure 2 of Zhang et al. 456 
(2016).  Mx corresponds to the memory component of the communicating X-machine 457 
(Figure 4). 458 
 459 
This concludes our presentation of (M,R) as three formal machine architectures.  The 460 
first of these, the finite state machine, cannot capture self-reference and therefore 461 
obviously fails to instantiate (M,R).  The second, the stream X-machine, permits 462 
some additional detail to be added to the system in terms of memory states, which 463 
assists with issues such as the number of times a catalyst can be reused, but 464 
nevertheless does not solve the problem of self-reference.  Only the third formal 465 
architecture, the communicating X-machine, allows us to transcend this impasse.  It 466 
does so by treating each component of (M,R), rather than the entire system, as a 467 
stream X-machine, and then forcing all entailments to be between individual stream 468 
X-machines in the form of messages.  The problem of self-reference, and the 469 
consequent mathematical impredicativity and Turing non-computability that is the 470 
central argument of relation biology as conceived by Rosen and Louie, is therefore 471 




sidestepped.  Object-orientation is a useful framework within which to build the 472 
(M,R) communicating X-machine.  473 
 474 
4. Discussion 475 
 476 
One of Rosen’s early papers on (M,R) (Rosen, 1964a) involved the analysis of (M,R) 477 
systems as sequential machines (Ginsburg, 1962), very close to finite state machines 478 
as defined in section 2.1.  Comparing the two, he remarked (pp. 109-110 of that 479 
paper):  480 
 481 
“in the theory of sequential machines […..] it is generally possible to extend the input 482 
alphabet without enlarging the set of states: that we cannot do […] directly in the 483 
theory of (M,R)-systems [which] points to a fundamental difference between the 484 
two theories.” 485 
 486 
This is essentially the same conclusion we draw in section 3.1 – in (M,R), states and 487 
input cannot be separated, thus making instantiation of (M,R) as a finite state 488 
machine impossible.  Expansion of the finite state machine to a stream X-machine is 489 
also inadequate, as the same problem of disentangling entailments from system 490 
states remains despite the addition of memory and output signalling functions.  491 
Generally, finite state machines and stream X-machines are designed at the system-492 
level, and are therefore abstractions of machines that receive their entailments from 493 
the environment.  (M,R), by virtue of its entirely internal entailment relations and 494 
consequent self-referential nature, cannot fit either simple finite state machine or 495 




stream X-machine requirements.  A machine that adequately represented (M,R) 496 
would require the capacity to be in two states simultaneously, or to have no states 497 
at all - in Rosen’s own words, to have “entailment without states” (Rosen, 1991).  498 
Since both of these defy our common-sense logic concerning machines, this would 499 
seem to re-inforce the general refutation of mechanism in biology that stems from 500 
Rosen’s work on (M,R). 501 
 502 
However, this conclusion rests on two premises: 503 
1) (M,R) is represented as a single machine. 504 
2) That machine representation of (M,R) is processed sequentially. 505 
Communicating X-machines are by definition composites of individual stream X-506 
machines.  For a communicating X-machine model composed of n stream X-507 
machines with memory maximum H, each stream X-machine may have states: 508 
• Q = {A, B, b0...bH-1, f, f’0...f’H-1, ϕ0...ϕH-1, Ω} 509 
as outlined in section 3.2, producing a total of 3H+4 possible states for each stream 510 
X-machine and a total state space, Q, of n(3H+4) for the communicating X-machine.  511 
For n = 100 and H = 3, Q = 1026.  Exhaustive permutation of the entire state space of 512 
the communicating X-machine therefore runs into technical problems - a single 513 
processor at 1010 FLOPS would require 1016 seconds, or 3.17 x 108 years to traverse 514 
all the possibilities.  Parallel processing is thus required, both from a standpoint of 515 
computational tractability, and arguably also because parallel activity is intuitively 516 
more in keeping with the nature of living systems (see Gatherer, 2007; Gatherer, 517 
2010 for further exploration of this issue). 518 
 519 




The communicating X-machine paradigm is therefore of necessity a massively 520 
parallel machine architecture, composed of individual stream X-machines, that 521 
permits all entailments to be internal to the system as a whole, but where for each 522 
individual X-machine within that system, the entailments are external, i.e. they are 523 
transmitted as communications from other stream X-machines in the collective.  524 
Each component stream X-machine at any moment has a system state which can 525 
also represent an entailment for any other component stream X-machine that it 526 
encounters within the system.  The communicating X-machine paradigm is the only 527 
formal machine architecture that is capable of representing (M,R).  Rosen’s 528 
insistence that (M,R) cannot be instantiated as a machine on account of its circular 529 
entailment structures and the paradoxes that arose from attempting to impose 530 
states onto it – which led to Rosen’s statement that (M,R) is state-free – can be seen 531 
to be consequences of a limited definition of a machine.  The use of the 532 
communicating X-machine architecture also deals with problems arising in our 533 
previous (Zhang et al., 2016) object-oriented analysis of (M,R), for instance our 534 
inability to produce a convincing UML state machine diagram for the entire system.  535 
We were, however, able to produce UML state machine diagrams for individual 536 
classes of objects, and these could provide the basis for their treatment as individual 537 
stream X-machines within a communicating X-machine environment.  The 538 
communicating X-machine provides the missing element in our object-oriented 539 
analysis of (M,R). 540 
 541 
Some problems nevertheless remain.  As with our previous attempted practical 542 
instantiation of (M,R) in process algebra (Gatherer and Galpin, 2013), this theoretical 543 




instantiation as a communicating X-machine forces us to take a literal stance 544 
towards the Goudsmit (2007) representation of (M,R) (Figure 1).  A, B, f and ϕ are no 545 
longer interpretable as general descriptions of metabolic or replacement functions 546 
but are sets of interacting molecules and the arrows within the (M,R) diagram 547 
represent events happening to such individual molecules.  Also, we are still faced 548 
with the problem of how dual-function components of (M,R) are to be defined 549 
within the system.  The relation between B as substrate and b as catalyst has been 550 
the subject of much discussion (Cardenas et al., 2010; Letelier et al., 2006; Louie, 551 
2011; Mossio et al., 2009), mainly because it is poorly defined with the relational 552 
biology literature stemming from Rosen and his disciples.  If we have not answered 553 
this issue it is because we are still unsure of the question.  The resulting compromise, 554 
used by us here and previously (Gatherer and Galpin, 2013; Zhang et al., 2016), is 555 
simply to allow a stochastic choice of catalytic or substrate product for the A→B and 556 
B→f reactions.  For some this may be a fatal flaw, but we submit that living systems 557 
are stochastic to some extent. 558 
 559 
The communicating X-machine paradigm expands the definition of a machine to 560 
something massively parallel, complex yet self-contained.  It is a more life-like 561 
machine than the limited definitions of the 20th century.  (M,R) was not one of those 562 
old machines, but something else entirely.  Rosen’s error was to conclude that it 563 
could not be a machine of any kind.  We can now see what kind of a machine it is.  It 564 
is also reducible.  Understanding of the properties of the individual stream X-565 
machines does lead to an understanding of the whole system through its 566 




representation as a communicating X-machine.  Systems biology may yet turn out to 567 
be both mechanist and reductionist. 568 
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